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Rehabilitating Resemblance Redux
A Reply to Anne-Kathrin Koch
Gerard O’Brien
Anne-Kathrin Koch’s insightful commentary places a great deal of pressure on the
connection between my deployment of the triadic analysis of representation to
solve the content causation problem and my contention that it makes mandatory
the rehabilitation of the resemblance theory of mental content determination. She
argues that if the relational character of mental content can be captured in terms
of brain-based behavioural dispositions, as I claim, then this manoeuvre in its own
right solves the content causation problem and hence offers no support for re-
semblance or any other theory of content determination. In this reply, I argue that
the relation between the proposed solution to the content causation problem and
the resemblance theory of content determination is stronger than Koch allows.
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1 Introduction
There is a paradoxical air surrounding mental
content. On the one hand we take it to be a loc-
alized  property  of  our  minds—of  our  mental
states—distinct from the world in which we are
embedded.  Yet  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  the
means by which our minds reach out and make
“cognitive contact” (Kriegel 2003) with this sur-
rounding environment. How is such action-at-a-
distance possible? The standard solution to this
conundrum is  to  assume  that  the  relational
character of mental content can be explained
by the fact that mental content is a relational
property of  our  mental  states.  This  line  of
thought leads to content externalism, accord-
ing to which mental  content  is  determined in
part by factors beyond our heads. But once con-
tent externalism is combined with a couple of
unexceptional theses about (i) the role of con-
tent in mental causation and (ii) the brain-basis
of the causal determinants of behaviour, we en-
counter the content causation problem—the
problem of explaining how the content of men-
tal  states  can be causally efficacious of  beha-
viour when it  doesn’t  supervene on what’s  in
our heads. 
The solution I offered in my target paper
was to sever the connection between the rela-
tional character of mental content and the as-
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sumption that the latter is a relational property
of  our mental states  (O’Brien this collection).
My suggestion was that unlike a  dyadic story
that  seeks  to  explain  representation  solely  in
terms  of  relations  between  vehicles  and  their
represented objects, a triadic account of repres-
entation  opens  up  space  to  explain  the  rela-
tional character of mental content in terms of
brain-based  behavioural  dispositions—specific-
ally, dispositions to respond selectively to spe-
cific features of the external environment. Ac-
cording to this triadic account, the aboutness
of mental content is not some mysterious rela-
tional property that brings our minds into con-
tact with various aspects of the surrounding en-
vironment;  it  is  the  relatively  straightforward
cognitive  capacity,  bestowed  by  the  intrinsic
properties of our brains, to regulate our beha-
viour in response to specific environmental con-
ditions. 
In her insightful commentary, Anne-Kath-
rin Koch, after carefully rendering explicit some
of the background assumptions on which I rely,
focuses on the connection between the proposed
solution to the content causation problem and
my further contention that it makes mandatory
the rehabilitation of the resemblance theory of
mental content determination (Koch this collec-
tion). Her counter claim is that if the relational
character of mental content can be successfully
captured in terms of the brain’s behavioural dis-
positions, then this manoeuvre in its own right
solves the content causation problem and hence
offers no support for resemblance or any other
theory of content determination. In this reply, I
will  show that  the  relation  between  the  pro-
posed solution to the content causation problem
and the resemblance theory of content determ-
ination is stronger than Koch allows.
2 Rejecting resemblance (and content 
causation)
The great  insight  of  Charles  Sanders  Peirce’s
analysis  of  representation  is  his  claim  that
aboutness can’t be explained solely in terms of
relations between representing vehicles and rep-
resented  objects  (Hardwick 1977).  Instead,
vehicles are about their objects in virtue of hav-
ing a certain kind of effect on a cognitive sub-
ject—specifically,  vehicles  either  trigger
thoughts about objects (in cases of public rep-
resentation) or they engender behavioural dis-
positions towards them (in cases of mental rep-
resentation). According to Peirce, it is this addi-
tional  relatum—known  as  interpretation—
that renders representation triadic. 
But once interpretation is added into the
representational  mix,  it  has  the  potential  to
overwhelm any content-grounding relations that
may obtain between vehicles and objects. This
is the thread that Koch astutely pulls on in her
commentary. To the extent that one can appeal
to the manner in which a representing vehicle
modifies a subject’s behavioural dispositions in
order to capture the relational character of con-
tent, it seems as though one can also appeal to
these  dispositions  to  fix  the  content  of  this
vehicle. In short, the triadic account would ap-
pear to make those theories of content determ-
ination that appeal to vehicle-object relations—
such  as  resemblance—redundant  (or,  at  least,
“only  indirectly  relevant”,  as  Koch charitably
puts it; this collection, p. 8).
Koch is not alone in drawing out this con-
sequence from the triadic nature of representa-
tion. It is precisely this idea about the role of
behavioural dispositions in content fixation that
forms the foundation of the instrumentalist ap-
proach  to  mental  representation  that  Daniel
Dennett has defended over many years (1978;
1987). Dennett was one of the early proponents
of  triadicity, insofar as  he argued that it  was
only in virtue of their roles in cognitive systems
that representing vehicles can be interpreted as
bearers of information:
There is a strong by tacit undercurrent of
conviction […]  to the effect that only by
being rendered explicit […] can an item of
information play a role. The idea, appar-
ently, is that in order to have an effect, in
order  to  throw  its  weight  around,  as  it
were, an item of information must weigh
something, must have a physical embodi-
ment […]. I suspect, on the contrary, that
this  is  almost  backwards.  [Representing
vehicles]… are by themselves quite inert as
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information bearers […]. They become in-
formation-bearers only when given roles in
larger systems. (Dennett 1982, p. 217)
Dennett has also famously argued that the con-
sequence of taking the triadic account seriously
is the rejection of any story that takes mental
content  to  be  determined  independently  of  a
cognitive creature’s patterns of behaviour.
Dennett’s  instrumentalist  approach  to
mental  representation,  however,  has  another
famous consequence. If the full burden of con-
tent determination falls on the shoulders of in-
terpretation—if,  that  is,  it  is  a  cognitive sys-
tem’s behavioural dispositions ultimately fix the
content of  its representing vehicles—then con-
tent is a product of cognition, not an ingredient,
and hence cannot be casually implicated in the
production of behaviour. 
This last point, of course, represents Den-
nett’s  own  solution  to  the  content  causation
problem:  he  abandons  the  thesis  that  mental
phenomena are causally efficacious of behaviour
in virtue of their representational contents (see
O’Brien this collection, fn. 1). This is also what
Koch is hinting at when she indicates that my
proposal to invoke the triadic account of repres-
entation might be better interpreted as reject-
ing the content causation problem rather than
solving it (Koch this collection, p. 8). That is,
far from showing that rehabilitation of the re-
semblance  theory  of  content  determination  is
mandatory, her (implicit) objection is that my
proposed  solution  to  the  content  causation
really shows that there is no such thing as con-
tent causation in the first place. 
3 Rehabilitating content causation (and 
resemblance)
To reiterate,  the  problem associated  with the
triadic  analysis  of  representation  is  that  once
behavioural dispositions are invoked in order to
explain the relational character of mental con-
tent,  they  threaten  to  overwhelm  any  other
story about mental content determination. But
if mental content is determined by such behavi-
oural dispositions, it can’t play a robust causal
role in their production. In short, the triadic ac-
count seems to suggest that there is no content
causation  problem because  there  is  no  con-
tent causation. 
In this context, however, it is pertinent to
note that, despite his insistence that representa-
tion is triadic, Peirce expends a good of effort
investigating the relations between representing
vehicles and represented objects. His analysis of
public  forms of  representation famously yields
three different kinds of vehicle–object relations
—convention,  causation,  and  resemblance—as-
sociated with symbols,  indexes,  and icons,  re-
spectively (see Hardwick 1977 and Von Eckardt
1993, Ch. 4). If  content determination is ulti-
mately  just  a  matter  of  interpretation,  why
would Peirce have been so bothered about these
vehicle–object relations?
The answer, of course, is that Peirce was
concerned  not  just  with  the  fact  that  public
representing  vehicles  effect  interpretations  in
cognitive subjects,  but  with  how they do so.
The point here is that interpretation isn’t magic
—it  requires  explanation.  Consider,  for  ex-
ample,  Leonardo  da  Vinci’s  Mona Lisa.  Ac-
cording to the triadic story, the painting that
hangs in the Louvre is not about anything on
its own. Its standing as a representing vehicle
hinges on its capacity to trigger interpretations
in  cognitive  subjects.  When  we  look  at  this
painting  it  causes  us  to  think  about  a  dark-
haired woman with a famously enigmatic smile.
But what is it about this painting that endows
it with this capacity? Part of the explanation
here invokes our recognition of the resemblances
between the painting and a woman with a cer-
tain kind of physical appearance. The painting
wouldn’t have the same impact on us if these
resemblances didn’t obtain. So a complete ac-
count of the painting’s aboutness must go bey-
ond the fact that it triggers certain thoughts in
us to include an explanation of how it does so.
And it is here that vehicle–object relations such
as resemblance are compulsory. 
The general lesson to take away from this
(far too brief) analysis is that the interpretation
of public forms of representation cannot be dis-
connected  from  the  cognitive  subject’s  (con-
scious or unconscious) recognition of what are
generally known as  content grounding rela-
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tions between vehicles and represented objects.
And what goes for the interpretation of public
representing vehicles also goes for the interpret-
ation of  mental vehicles.  On the triadic story
being entertained here, mental vehicles, just like
the  Mona  Lisa,  aren’t  about  anything  con-
sidered in isolation. Their aboutness is a con-
sequence of the multifarious behavioural dispos-
itions  they create in  us towards selective fea-
tures of the world—dispositions to physically in-
teract  with these  features,  for  example,  or  to
make utterances about them. Since this form of
interpretation likewise isn’t  magic,  a complete
account of mental representation must explain
how mental vehicles establish these behavioural
capacities. And just as with the case of public
representing vehicles, it is impossible to do this
without recourse to content-grounding relations
(something  that  is  demonstrated  by  even  ex-
ceedingly  simple  representation-using  devices
such  as  the  humble  thermostat—see  O’Brien
this collection, pp. 7–9). 
Precisely  because  content-grounding  rela-
tions  must  be  invoked  to  explain  how  the
former  endow  cognitive  systems  with  behavi-
oural  dispositions  towards  the  latter,  content
causation is back in business. But what kind of
vehicle–object  relations  can  turn  this  trick?
This, of course, was one of the central questions
that animated much of my discussion in the tar-
get paper (O’Brien this collection). Of the three
grounding relations that Peirce found to be im-
plicated in public forms of representation—con-
vention, causation, and resemblance—the first is
widely  assumed  to  be  unavailable  for  mental
representation since  it  violates  the  naturalism
constraint.1 Despite is popularity in contempor-
ary philosophy,  the  second,  I  argued at  some
length,  is  actually  powerless  to  explain  how
mental vehicles create the requisite behavioural
1 This is the requirement that mental representation be explained
without appeal to further forms of representation. If a vehicle is
related to its object by convention, the cognitive subject must de-
ploy a rule that specifies how the vehicle is to be interpreted. In
the  case  of  non-mental  representation,  where  for  example  the
vehicle is a word in a natural language, the application of such a
rule is a cognitive achievement that must be explained in terms
of processes defined over mental representing vehicles. When this
same account  is  applied to  mental  vehicles,  therefore,  it  would
seem  to  generate  an  infinite  regress  of  further  representing
vehicles, and hence interpretation is never achieved (see Von Eck-
ardt 1993, p. 206). 
dispositions (this collection, pp. 6–7). This just
leaves  us  with  resemblance.  Fortunately,  this
third vehicle–object relation is up to the task,
or  at  least  so  my  argument  went,  since  the
structural  properties  of  mental  vehicles  that
ground second-order resemblance relations can
be exploited to shape the behavioural disposi-
tions of a cognitive system towards worldly ob-
jects (this collection, p. 8). This is  where the
rubber of resemblance meets the road of content
causation. And it is why a resemblance theory
of content determination is mandatory if we are
to explain why mind matters.
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